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ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the relation between forecasting report disclosure and stock price fluctuations. The first 
hypothesize examine if there is a relation between two variables among companies which lead to fluctuation in the 
stock price and the second hypothesize examined these variables over research industries. 
Capital market reacts to new information–in most cases- at least one month before the official date of the 
disclosure. We found evidence of fluctuation in stock prices before disclosure indicate that information was released to 
the market before official disclosure. In the other word, stock prices react to the unofficially released information and 
rumors to the market around the releasing new officially disclosure date. This fraudulent attempt was initiated by price 
manipulation in cases which we don’t see significant price change during forecasted disclosure even if there are 
significant change in reported earning values. 
This investigation indicates that there is a significant relationship between releasing forecasted information and 
stock price fluctuations in the selected listed companies in TSE. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The disclosure of corporate annual forecast is a main topic in capital markets during recent years. This paper with 
attention to many researchers (Adina et Al, 2008; Barako et al, 2006; Akhtarudin, 2005; Omar et al, 2011 and others)  
empirically investigated the relationship between level of mandatory disclosure and and stock price fluctuations. Most 
of these inquiries appear to assume that an investor's belief and/or actions may be affected by the disclosure of 
management forecast and variable that could make affected such forecast. 
Moonitz, Maurice(1961), constructed disclosure as an imperative postulate. He described it in negative 
terms:"…that is necessary to make them (accounting reports and forecast operations for the forthcoming year) not 
misleading." 
Harry I. Wolk et al (2000) defined disclosure as refers to relevant information both inside and outside the main 
body of the financial statements themselves, including methods employed in financial statements where more than 
one choice exists or unusual or innovative selection of method arises. 
DR.S.N. Maheshwari and S.K. Maheshwari (2009) worked on attribute of full disclosure. According to their 
research, accounting report should disclose fully and fairly the information they purport to represent. They should be 
honestly prepared and sufficiently disclose the information which is material interest proprietors, present and potential 
creditors and investors. 
Eldon S.Hendrikson and Michael F. Van Breda (1991), researched about disclosure in the broadest sense of the 
word. They stated that disclosure simply means the release of information. Accountants tend to use the word in a 
slightly more restrictive sense to mean the release of financial information about a company within a financial report, 
generally annual report. 
Disclosure takes place in two species: “a) mandatory disclosure, when regulatory authorities impose on companies 
to disclose certain elements of information; and b) voluntary disclosure, when companies decide to disclose more 
information than required because they deem that this will benefit them. Managers should carefully plan their 
disclosure strategy as the benefits include improved reputation of the company in market, less political and regulation 
intervention and enhanced stock liquidity” (Entwistle, 1997). 
Most of the research so far has focused on exploring the voluntary rather than the mandatory disclosure (Einhorn, 
2005), despite the fact that both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are potentially important (Omar et al, 2011). 
Indeed, voluntary disclosure, among others, lowers the cost of capital, increases the company market value and 
reduces the asymmetry of information (Bruslerie et al., 2010). Several studied examined the relationship between 
share price anticipation of earnings and voluntary disclosure (Hussainey et al., 2003; 2009; Healy et al., 2001). These 
findings suggest that when companies voluntarily increase the 
Extent of disclosure and the ability of stock market to predict the changes of future earnings is considerably 
improved given the significant interaction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure (Yu, 2011). 
But Despite these evident benefits, there were still concerns about how proper the disclosure was, due to the 
reporting options available to managers, as they could follow either the local GAAP or the IFRSs proposed by IASB. 
The situation has changed since 2005, insofar as IFRSs enhance the transparency of accounting numbers and 
reduce the scope for judgment and earnings manipulation (Iatridis, 2008). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of mandatory disclosure of corporate forecasts on stock price 
behavior. The sample is included a list of companies in Tehran stock exchange (TSE) as an emerging market for a 
period of three years, from 2010 to 2012. In this light, the next section presents the literature review regarding 
disclosure, motives for disclosure, measurement techniques, and salient factors of disclosure extent. Then we discuss 
an overview of TSE and its disclosure rules for registered companies in Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO) 
of Iran. Next, the hypotheses, the methodology and the sample of the study are reported. The research findings are 
presented afterwards, and the last section deals with conclusions, limitations and recommendations. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many research in domain of financial reporting during recent years covered various aspects of disclosure such as 
attribute of forecasting firms (e.g., George Iatridis, 2005; Roger Debreceny & Asheq Rahman, 2005 and Eugene C.M. 
Cheng a, Stephen M. Courtenay, 2006), regulation (Bikki Jaggi and his colleagues, 2006), earning management 
(Merle Erickson, Shiing-wu Wang, 1999) and manager behavior (Shuping Chen and colleagues, 2002) to economic 
consequences of financial reporting. Financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for 
management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. Paul M. Healy*, Krishna G. 
Palepu (2001) provided a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital markets 
setting. Several researchers studied about determinant of ownership of disclosing firms (Cox, C.,1985), Miles 
Gietzmann, (2006) analyzed disclosure of timely and forward-looking statements in relation with strategic 
management of major institutional ownership and found that increased corporate disclosure of industry-specific, non-
financial and non-reutilized information does increase the stability of the holdings by major institutional investors. 
Gerald K. Chaua, Sidney J. Gray, (2002) examined the association of ownership structure with the voluntary 
disclosures and Shuqing Luoa and colleagues (2006) examined the effect of voluntary disclosure on the relationship 
between current annual return, contemporaneous annual earnings and future earnings, and the influence of both 
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ownership structure and proprietary cost on this relationship. They found that existence of outside block ownership 
significantly decreases managers' ability to limit voluntary disclosure. Quarterly reporting in a voluntary disclosure 
environment was studied by Asheq Razaur Rahman and his colleagues, (2007), They found that a firm with high 
growth prospects, large size and a technology orientation is likely to disclose earnings on a quarterly basis. 
Some research works on mandatory or voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is governed by regulatory 
agencies in all countries around the world (Healy et al., 2001; Akhtaruddin, 2005). Regulators force companies to 
disclose information that companies may wish to hide (Darrough, 1993). One of the explanations for disclosure 
regulation is the concern of the regulatory bodies to safeguard the welfare of ordinary investors (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986; Taplin et al., 2002). Regulators aim to redistribute the wealth between informed and uniformed investors by 
requiring a minimum level of disclosure, as the information gap among them is expected to shorten (Healy et al., 
1999). Furthermore, the credibility of the information in capital markets is positively influenced by the existence of 
disclosure regulation, which also ensures companies’ compliance to the regulatory requirements (Al-Htaybat et al., 
2006). 
Shuping and colleagues, 2002 investigated a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice including financial statements 
with quarterly earnings announcements. They found that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current 
earnings are relatively less informative, or when future earnings are relatively more uncertain. Another research 
(Jeroen Suijs, 2006 and Eti Einhorn, 2007) acknowledged these results. 
Concerning about accuracy and precision forecasts and abilities of firm to provide reliable report was topics of 
some other researches (Bikki Jaggi and et al, 2006; Hoje Jo, Yongtae Kim, 2007) 
Gregory Waymire,(1986), has examined the relative accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts prepared both before 
(prior forecasts) and after (posterior forecasts) voluntary management earnings forecasts. The results of his 
investigation about the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts before and after voluntary management forecasts 
suggested that management forecasts are more accurate than prior analyst forecasts and posterior analyst forecasts 
are no more accurate than management forecasts. His concluded that accuracy differences were the likely artifact of 
inside information held by the manager at the time of forecast disclosure. (Hassell J., R. Jennings et al, 1988) 
The relation between insider activities and forecast disclosure were analyzed by several researches. Christopher 
F. Noe (1999) investigated the association between voluntary disclosures and insider transactions (i.e., transactions 
by managers in their own firms' shares). His findings suggested that managers do not make insider transactions to 
profit from news about their own firms just before it becomes publicly available. However, managers appear to employ 
other strategies for exploiting private information when making insider transactions. Also, managers take advantage of 
knowledge about their own firms' long-term prospects while utilizing voluntary disclosures to shield themselves against 
profiteering allegations. Other researcher found stronger evidence about using forecast discourse by insider users 
(Eugene F. Fama, 1970). Chena and colleagues,( 2002) studied about relation between disclosure regulation and the 
profitability of insider trading in New Zealand market. The results showed that insiders earn significantly large 
abnormal returns on their transactions, with the gains coming largely from transactions involving delayed disclosure. 
In contrast, transactions involving immediate disclosure earn insignificant returns. These findings strongly support the 
amendments to securities laws that require continuous disclosure for all transactions. 
David Aboody and Ron Kasznik",(2000), investigated whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary 
disclosures around stock option awards. They conjectured that CEOs manage investors' expectations around award 
dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. They found that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary 
disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation. Also, Ranga Narayanan (1999), found that 
managers have use a partial disclosure policy for good or bad news where they have private information and 
opportunities to trade on it as Insider. 
Roger Debreceny a, Asheq Rahman,(2005), studied about firm-specific determinants of continuous corporate 
disclosures. They attempt to identify the firm-specific determinants of discretionary disclosures. They examined the 
frequency and regularity of online announcements on the stock exchange websites of companies included in the 
Morgan Stanley Capital Index for small-cap firms in eight developed markets in Asia and Europe. They found that 
firms with higher information asymmetry have a higher frequency and regularity of continuous online reporting. 
Ahmadpour and colleagues (2009), in their research investigate XBRL (Extensible Business Reporting Language) 
and growing interest in modern financial reporting technologies and disclosure among developing countries, this study 
examined the potential for implementing online financial reporting using extensible Business Reporting Language 
(XBRL) in Tehran Stock Exchange. The results of this research illustrated that there is a high level of efficiency in 
disclosure in modern financial reporting technology. 
The issue of timeliness of financial reporting as an important qualitative characteristic of accounting information, 
has received much attention from regulatory and professional bodies in many countries in recent years. ‘Does 
timeliness of mandatory corporate forecasts disclosure systematically influence stock prices in stock markets?’ This 
question has received a good deal of attention in the financial disclosure literature. In a research paper, Lang, M. and 
R. Lundholm, )2000) has examined corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relation to 
stock prices. In their sample, beginning six months before the offering, issuing firms dramatically increase their 
disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. They found 
that firms which maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering and only 
minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have 
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reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. They showed firms that substantially increase their 
disclosure activity in the six months prior to the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to 
the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting 
that the disclosure increase may have been used to "hype the stock" and the market may have partially corrected for 
the earlier price increase (Healy, P. and K. Palepu, 2001). 
James M. Patell,(1976) researched about relation between cooperate forecasts of earning per share and stock 
price behavior. He found that there was a statistically significant upward price change during the week of forecast 
disclosure, beyond that explained by movement of the market as a whole. When using a measurement technique 
which includes sign, the price adjustment was, on average, of the same sign and magnitude as that which 
accompanied the subsequent announcement of realized annual earnings. Also, he found that during the two months 
preceding the disclosure of the forecast, price adjustment was in the same direction as the change in “native” 
expectations embodied in the forecast. Forecast which exceeded estimates of market expectations were preceded by 
positive price adjustments and forecasts which fell short of market expectations were preceded by negative price 
adjustments. Regardless of the sign of the estimated change in the market expectations of future earnings, on 
average, the immediate forecast week was the occasion of upward price revision. Subsequent price behavior was 
relatively level of the positive forecast group and continued to decline for negative forecast group. (Erickson, M. and S. 
Wang, 1999) 
3. MANDATORY FORECAST DISCLOSURE IN TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE 
The data on stocks traded on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) in Iran show a market that is still developing. 
Significant restrictions remain, most prominently the continued US restrictions on direct investment. Recent annual 
returns of over 40% have placed it in the forefront of exchanges in developing countries. (Kevin R. Foster, Ali Kharazi, 
2008). A government privatization plan revived the moribund TSE in 1989, which by the end of 2008 listed over 430 
companies. 
In TSE all companies are listed on two boards. Companies listed on the “First Board” must have capital of at least 
20 billion Rails and be held sufficiently widely (the government cannot own a majority stake). (Bagherian Kasgeri, A., 
2007) 
By ratifying new capital market law in 22 November, 2005, Securities and Exchanges Organization of Iran is 
responsible for regulation on issuer companies. In the execution of the capital market law, companies in TSE are 
obliged to adapt to the “Disclosure Rule of Registered Companies in Securities and Exchange Organization (hereafter 
SEO)”. 
By another section of this rule, companies must disclose management forecasted yearly financial and forecast 
reports for companies and their consolidated at least 30 days before starting new financial year and comment of the 
auditor report to the maximum 20 days after disclosing issuer report. Also they must restate their forecasted report 
regarding to quarterly actual report to maximum 30 days after of ending of first, second and third quarter and also it is 
required to comment of the auditor report on forecasted report regarding to first 6 month actual report be disclosed 
maximum 20 days after disclosing issuer report. Also auditors must declare their comment on forecasted report when 
it seems to be a significant change in latest forecasted report maximum 20 days after disclosure date. (Statement of 
financial accounting concept, 1978) 
Although, this rules was mandated before ratifying new capital market law but after that new supervision team 
have move more authority to involve issuer companies. There are some means like quarterly disclosure rankings and 
tax discount permission which help regulators to enforce this rule (Sadr Ara & et al, 2011). Companies which don’t 
adapt to these rules would be suspended and even in serious cases would be delisted from TSE. 
Article 45 of capital market law prohibited insiders from trade based on their private information. Also insiders 
including mangers of companies are obliged to report their trade to SEO. In TSE, market supervision would halt 
trading of issuer companies in suspected cases to private information trading. 
By the new act, Securities and Exchanges Organization as a regulatory firm in Iranian capital market is responsible 
for performing surveillance duties over TSE (Bagherian Kasgeri, A., 2007). 
So, this paper intends to analyze prior forecast report of issuer companies in TSE and analyzes their impaction 
stock price fluctuation. 
4. HYPOTHESES, METHOD AND DATA 
4.1. Hypothesis development 
In the recent years listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange have disclosed their annual forecast report and 
these events mostly lead to fluctuation in the stock prices. Fluctuation in the stock prices after mandatory disclosing 
forecast report arise this question that dose mandatory disclose of companies forecast information caused to 
fluctuation in the stock price. In this research we are looking for an answer to this question. For this purpose and also 
evaluating the relationship between companies forecast mandatory disclosure and stock price fluctuation, the first 
research hypothesis is: 
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H1.  Mandatory disclosure forecast report of company lead to fluctuation in the stock price. 
Also many investors and financial annalists are interested to know the relation between events inside the 
companies to the whole industry. To find answer this question we examine the second hypothesis. 
H2. Mandatory disclosure forecast reports in the industry lead to fluctuation in the industry stock price. 
4.2. Methodology 
In this research we intend to examine the relation between pair variables explaining goal of research. (Auditing 
Standards, 2005) 
This is performed through analyzing the relation between disclosure of the forecast report and fluctuations in the 
stock price. So we defined two major pair variables. Variable X represent stock price of the listed companies in Tehran 
Stock Exchange before disclosing forecast report. According to the martingale condition of prices, (Lang, M. and R. 
Lundholm, 2000) 5 observations before date of forecast disclosure are used for variable X. 
Also, variable Y represent stock price of the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange after disclosing forecast 
report. According to the martingale condition of prices, (Lang, M. and R. Lundholm, 2000) 5 observations after date of 
forecast disclosure are used for these variables. One of the main objectives of the statistical analysis is to determine 
the relation between two variables. This paper uses statistical method for testing research hypothesis1. In this section 
we want to describe statistical method that is applied in this research. 
Let to assume a population with the same attribute, like stock price of listed companies in Tehran stock Exchange. 
We distributed this population to before and after disclosed companies. 
Now we used two kind of test, 1) Bootstrap test method for analysis of relation between disclosure and stock price 
fluctuation in level of TSE as a whole and 2) Paired sample t- student test method for analysis of relationship between 
disclosure and stock price fluctuation in level of companies and industries. In this section we want to examine paper 
hypothesis claim that stock price of companies that disclosed forecast report had fluctuation in comparison to that 
companies not disclosed their forecast report. 
Considering N observation of this population, null hypothesis is defined as below: 
0 : d nH    
Where: 
d

: Mean stock price of the companies after disclosed their forecast report. 
n

: Mean stock price of the companies before disclosed their forecast report. 
We calculate sample mean and variance for each population by 660 observations. In order to perform this test: 
x = Stock price mean in a given period for companies after disclosed their forecast. 
y
= Stock price mean in a given period for companies before disclosed their forecast. 
2
1S  :  Stock price variance in a given period for companies after disclosed their forecast. 
2
2S : Stock price variance in a given period for companies before disclosed their forecast 
Now we calculate test parameter as below: 
0
2
p
x y
t
S


 
Where x and y defined as mean stock price after and before forecast disclosure (Sarmad & et al, 2000). We compute 
2 2
2 1 1 2 2
1 2
( 1) ( 1)
2
p
n S n S
S
n n
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
 
 
                                                          
1
 examining hypothesis validity 
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So using T-test table and regarding to statistical error  that commonly we get it 0.05 ( =0.05) to calculate 
1 2 2, /2n n
t    where 1 2
2n n 
 is degree of freedom. With comparing 0
t
 and 1 2 2, /2n n
t    conclude that: 
We reject H0 if 1 20 2, /2
| | n nt t   that means there is difference between two groups of after and before 
disclosed in companies. In the other hand if 1 20 2, /2
| | n nt t    then we accept null hypothesis that means 
statistically there is no difference between two periods of time (Gourieroux & Jasiak, 2001). 
This method is used when two population are independent for each other. Whereas there are some dependencies in 
the populations we use Bootstrap-t test and paired sample t test for paired observation. 
4.3.  Bootstrap-t Test Method 
We use Bootstrap-t test method for paired observation where we intend to analyze stock price before and after 
disclosure of forecast report in whole of market. The basic idea of bootstrapping is that inference about a population 
from sample data (sample -> population) can be modeled by resampling the sample data and performing inference on 
(resample -> sample). We define null hypothesis as below: 
H0 : µbefore = µafter 
H1 : µbefore ≠ µafter 
µbefore : Mean of stock price before disclosure of forecast report 
µafter : Mean of stock price after disclosure of forecast report 
The bootstrap begins with an original sample taken from the population, then calculates sample statistics.  Next, 
the bootstrap copies the original sample several times to create a pseudopopulation. The bootstrap uses the empirical 
density function (EDF) (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).  From the pseudopopulation, the bootstrap draws several 
samples with replacement (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).  The bootstrap’s strength is its ability to develop a sample that 
is the same size of the original sample that may include an observation several times while omitting other 
observations.  Random sampling with replacement provides different samples from the original sample. As the 
bootstrap draws the samples with replacement, it calculates statistics for each sample. 
4.3 Paired Sample t-test Method 
We use Paired sample-t test method for paired observation where we intend to analyze stock price before and 
after disclosure of forecast report. We define null hypothesis as below: 
0 : befor afterH  
 
b : Mean of stock price before disclosure of forecast report 
a : Mean of stock price after disclosure of forecast report 
In this method we assume i
x
 for saving attribute values before test and i
y
 for after test attribute values. We 
calculate i i i
d y x 
 for difference value and use 0
t
 as test parameter. Above null hypothesis is equivalent to
0 : 0dH   . So we define 0t test parameter for performing 
2T -test as below: 
0
2
d
d
t
S

 
Where: 
1
1 n
ii
d d
n 
 
as i
d
 mean and also 
2 2
1
1
( )
1
n
d ii
S d d
n 
 


 as i
d
 variance. 
Then we analyze the results using t-student table and comparing 1, /2n
t   to 0
t
 whereas: 
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We reject 0
H
 if 0 1, /2
| | nt t  . It mean there significant difference between stock fluctuation before and after 
disclosure. In the other word, there is a relationship between mandatory disclosure of forecast report and stock price 
fluctuation. 
4.4 Data and sample selection 
Method of this paper for data collection was statistical sampling. In this research stock price data for period from 
2010 ending to 2012 was provided from Tehran Stock Exchange official website that is accessible with address 
http://www.irbourse.com. We get 5 day window for stock price around the forecast disclosure date. We explain more 
this approach in this section. 
The martingale condition of prices implies that the best (nonlinear) prediction of the future price is the current price 
(Miraskari & et al, 2011; Saeedi & et al, 2012). The current price conveys all information that can help to predict next 
price that can be directly used as a predictor (Lang, M., 2000). Regarding to this theorem we collection our sample 
from 3 years period ending to 2012 that are accessible and updated. 
We collected 5 observations for pre-disclosure period for monitoring treatment prior to disclosure and 5 
observations for post-disclosure period as well. In the same vein, disclosure data of listed companies was provided by 
securities and exchange organization of Iran. 
Statistical population of this research included 377 listed companies in the TSE that belong to 18 industry groups. 
We find disclosure date of companies from Surveillance on Issuer of Office in Securities and Exchange Organization 
of Iran. For running the research method we consider below limitations in selecting companies: 
1. Companies that their financial year was ended to the March (In most of the Persian companies financial year is 
March because is matched to end of Persian year.) 
2. Companies that have disclosed their forecast report during the period from 2010 ending to the 2012. 
3. There was trade prior and after disclosing forecast report. or 
4. Their forecast report was disclosed before due date of begin of May.(By TSE disclosure rule Persian 
company’s due date for late issuing forecast report is end of April.) 
Regarding to above limitation from 377 listed companies in TSE 44 companies was selected to be considered in 
this research. 
5. DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Findings 
In this section we discussed about our finding for accepting or rejecting research’s hypothesizes. As mentioned in 
the previous section, we select 44 companies to be considered in research that their data are reported in the appendix 
1. We have two hypothesizes. We used paired repeated observation and post and pre-Test values analysis for 
examining each hypothesizes. 
Hypothesis 1: Disclosing forecasted company’s reports lead to fluctuation in their stock prices. 
Hypothesis 2: Disclosing forecasted industry’s reports lead to fluctuation in their stock prices. 
For examining above hypothesizes we applied paired repeated observation method for inferring using T2 
parameter. 
5.1.1. Analyzing relation between forecasted financial report disclosure and stock price fluctuations 
At first, we examined the relationship between disclosure and stock price fluctuation in TSE as a whole. For that 
we used Bootstrap-t test. In this method, we have 660 observations, the bootstrap process is start by a random 
sampling with stable size and resampling again and again. For 95% confidence intervals we needed at least 39 
observations
2
 to processing. The result of Bootstrap-t test is show in table 1 and the output of software is showed in 
appendix 1. 
Table 1: The result of Bootstrap paired sample test in TSE as whole 
 Mean Std. Error Mean Sig. (2-tailed) 
Pair1   x-y -169.215 101.74 0.475 
As can be seen, the significant of bootstrap test is 0.475 that is greater than 0.05 and in 95% confidence interval, 
H1 Hypothesis is rejected and the H0 hypothesis will be accepted. The result illustrated that in Tehran stock exchange, 
                                                          
2
 Based on SPSS software 
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mandatory disclosure have not information content, in other words, the mandatory disclosure have not any 
relationship with stock price fluctuations. In the following, we evaluate two hypotheses of this research. 
For analysis of 44 sample companies, both sectional and general analysis methods are used for finding relations 
between variables. In this section we report the findings for companies and industries in statistical tables. 
To compare two types of period for hypothesizes 1 and 2, we measured paired variables in three years. For any 
company, we have 15 observations before disclosure and same amount after disclosure. To compare variables in two 
tables, we have 
tn-1,(α/2) = t14,0.025 =2.145 
If t-statistics parameter for any paired was more than 2.145 then we would accept the hypothesis and if not we 
would reject it for that case. This variables use for testing hypothesis 1 and 2.  This results prove that there is (not) a 
significant relationship between forecast report disclosure and stock price fluctuations in the yearly period from 2010 
to 2012 for each company/industry. 
5.1.2 Findings for hypothesizes 1: Companies 
Table 1 reported the investigation results of 44 companies in the research sample. We will reject the null 
hypothesis if the test parameter value in the first column (table 2) be greater than 2.145. In the other word, in such 
cases there is significant relation between company price fluctuation and disclosure of forecasted report. 
Table2: The results of test hypothesis 1 for 44 sample Companies during years 2010-12 
Company Name Paired Sample-t Test coefficient Sig 
Daroupakhsh Pharmaceutical Mfg. 1.346 0.200 
Daroupakhsh Pharmacy -2.250 0.041 
Daroupakhsh Pharmacy chemical -0.840 0.415 
Osvah Pharmacutical Co. 2.167 0.048 
Zahravi Pharmacutical Co. -2.198 0.045 
Razak Laboratories -3.046 0.009 
Abouraihan Pharmaceutical Co. -2.466 0.027 
Kowsar Pharmacutical Co. 5.097 0.000 
Rouz Darou Pharmacutical -0.175 0.864 
Iran Parenteral Products Co. -0.595 0.561 
Exir Pharmacutical Co. -1.010 0.330 
Damloran Pharmacutical Co. -3.233 0.006 
Loghman Pharmacutical Co. -2.592 0.021 
Iran Carbon Co. -1.657 0.120 
Khark Petrochemical Co. 1.527 0.149 
Nirocholor Co. 3.810 0.002 
Loabiran Co. -1.991 0.066 
Ardebil Cement Co. 0.231 0.820 
Shargh Cement Co. 2.794 0.014 
Sepahan Cement Co. 2.990 0.010 
Ardekan Ind.Ceramic Co. -2.362 0.033 
Glass And Gas Co -2.623 0.020 
Iran China Clay ind.Co. 3.549 0.003 
Iran  Tractor Mfg.Co. -0.101 0.921 
Pars Khodro Co. 0.436 0.670 
Electric Khodro Shargh Co. -6.458 0.000 
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Chadormalu Mineral Ind. 1.146 0.271 
Metals & Min Co. 3.042 0.009 
Sepahan Industrial Group Co. -0.889 0.389 
Iran M. & P. M 0.927 0.370 
Khoy Sugar Co.(Shahd) -0.835 0.418 
Noush Mazandaran Inc. -2.376 0.032 
Rayan Saipa -2.428 0.029 
Iran Leasing Co. 5.579 0.000 
Firoza Co. 0.066 0.949 
Iran  Combin Mfg.Co. -3.829 0.002 
Pars Tile Co. 2.307 0.037 
Alvand Tile Ceramic Ind. -0.707 0.491 
Sand Foundry prepration Co. -3.274 0.006 
Iran Argham Co. -1.096 0.292 
Kaveh Paper Ind. 0.581 0.571 
Negin Tabas Lignite Co. -1.476 0.162 
Pars International Mfg.Co. -2.778 0.015 
Iran Transfo Co. -1.473 0.163 
For eliminating the effect of external variables which would affected on company price fluctuation, the differences 
between industry indices’ trend and stock price is analyzed to the resulted be confirmed. This way, for industries 
which had little number of companies (less that 15) the stock exchange index is used for comparison of trend. 
5.1.3 Findings for hypothesizes 2: Industries 
In this section the findings for 11 sample industries are reported in statistical table 3. Same as the Table 2, we will 
reject the null hypothesis if the test parameter value in the first column be greater than t-statistical. Because of 
different between the degree of freedom in any industry from another, we use significant value which in 95% 
confidence interval is 0.05. In the other word, in such cases there is significant relation between industry price index 
fluctuation and disclosure events. 
Table 3: The results of test hypothesis 2 for 11 sample industries during years 2010-12 
Name Industry Paired Sample-T Test Sig 
Pharmaceuticals -1.750 0.082 
Chemicals & By-products 0.360 0.720 
Cement, Lime & Gypsum 1.690 0.098 
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products -0.746 0.459 
Motor Vehicles And Auto Parts -0.660 0.513 
Metal Ores Mining 2.817 0.009 
Basic Metals 0.271 0.788 
Food and Non-sugar Products -2.254 0.032 
Other Financial Intermediaries -2.019 0.053 
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Machinery & Equipment -2.333 0.027 
Textiles 1.928 0.064 
5.2. Analysis of results 
Providing relevant, reliable and timely information is an important goal of financial reporting. Only in such situation, 
investors can make a rational decision. For this purpose, companies should disclose their forecast report to make it 
possible for investors to draw a prospective for the future. This can lead to a decrease in risk of investment in stock. 
Results of current research would help investor to have a better prospective in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this section 
we summarize the results. 
5.2.1 Analysis of the results for hypothesis 1 
The research results for H1 are divided in two groups. Table 4 demonstrated the list of companies that H1 is not 
rejected for them and table 5 included the list of companies that have not such situation. There are 8 companies which 
have no significant change in their forecasted reported value but their prices were affected during disclosure date. It 
seems this is because of affecting their market by rumors which were disclosed by speculators. 
Based on information dissemination rules for registered issuer companies in TSE, in case of disseminating rumors, 
false or misleading information or reports among market participants, issuer companies must provide urgent 
disclosure to Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran to be disseminated among market participants. 
As table 5 showed there were five companies with no significant change in reported forecast report. It seems that 
rumors were the motivation for price movement for these companies. 
In such cases, surveillance on issuers department in Securities and Exchange Organization of Iran investigates 
need for further disclosure by issuer companies or halting trade for confirming about fair distribution information 
among all investors. Although, the supervision department in Tehran Stock Exchange is responsible for investigating 
probable market manipulation evidences. 
Table 4: list of companies that H1 is accepted for them 
Company Name 
Reasons for accepting Hypothesis 1 
Timely Disclosure 
Significant Change in 
Reported Value 
Rumors / 
Manipulation 
1 Daroupakhsh Pharmacy chemical   - 
2 Osvah Pharmaceutical Co.  -  
3 Zahravi Pharmaceutical Co.   - 
4 Abouraihan Pharmaceutical Co.   - 
5 Rouz Darou Pharmaceutical  -  
6 Kowsar Pharmaceutical Co.   - 
7 Damloran Pharmacutical Co.   - 
8 Loghman Pharmacutical Co.  -  
9 Nirocholor Co.   - 
10 Loabiran Co.  -  
11 Shargh Cement Co.   - 
12 Sepahan Cement Co.   - 
13 Ardekan Ind.Ceramic Co.   - 
14 Glass And Gas Co   - 
ISSN 2278-5612 
1491 | P a g e                  M a r c h ,  2 0 1 4  
15 Iran China Clay ind.Co.   - 
16 Electric Khodro Shargh Co.   - 
17 Metals & Min Co.   - 
18 Noush Mazandaran Inc.  -  
19 Rayan Saipa   - 
20 Iran Leasing Co.  -  
21 Iran  Combin Mfg.Co.   - 
22 Pars Tile Co.   - 
23 Sand Foundry prepration Co.  -  
24 Pars International Mfg.Co.  -  
Although there are companies (displayed in table 5) that had timely disclosure but H1 is rejected about these 
companies because of having no significant change in their reported value or affecting information on prices before 
disclosure date. Interestingly there were only three evidences of high changes in price before disclosure which was 
detected prior to disclosure window. 
Prices change before disclosure date would be results of information asymmetry. So, we can investigate them for 
finding evidence for private information trading in these companies. 
Table 5: List of companies that H1 is rejected for them 
Company Name 
Reasons for Rejecting Hypothesis 1 
Timely Disclosure 
No Significant 
Change in Reported 
Value 
Change in price 
before disclosure 
window 
1 Daroupakhsh Pharmaceutical Mfg.   - 
2 Daroupakhsh Pharmacy chemical  -  
3 Rouz Darou Pharmacutical   - 
4 Iran Parenteral Products Co.   - 
5 Exir Pharmacutical Co.   - 
6 Iran Carbon Co.   - 
7 Khark Petrochemical Co.  -  
8 Ardebil Cement Co.   - 
9 Iran  Tractor Mfg.Co.   - 
10 Pars Khodro Co.   - 
11 Chadormalu Mineral Ind.   - 
12 Sepahan Industrial Group Co.   - 
13 Iran M. & P. M  -  
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14 Khoy Sugar Co.(Shahd)   - 
15 Firoza Co.   - 
16 Alvand Tile Ceramic Ind.   - 
17 Iran Argham Co.   - 
18 Kaveh Paper Ind.   - 
19 Negin Tabas Lignite Co.    
20 Iran Transfo Co.    
5.2.2 Analysis of the results for hypothesis 2 
The results of research for H2 are divided in two groups. Table 6 is demonstrated the list of industries that H2 is 
accepted for them and table 7 is demonstrated the list of industries that H2 is rejected for them. The first group 
Industries had considerable increase/decrease in their forecast but the second group hadn’t significant changes in 
their reported value that are suspected to have some evidence about information asymmetric. By reviewing on 
companies we found that in some cases change in price is appeared before disclosure of forecast. This proves that in 
these cases we have high probability of private information trading. 
Table 6: list of companies that H2 is accepted for them 
Industry Name 
Reasons for accepting Hypothesis 1 
Timely Disclosure 
Significant 
Change in 
Reported Value 
Rumors(Price 
manipulation) 
1 Metal Ores Mining   - 
2 Food and Non-sugar Products   - 
3 Machinery & Equipment  -  
Table 7: list of companies that H2 is rejected for them 
Industry Name 
Reasons for Rejecting Hypothesis 1 
Timely 
Disclosure 
No Significant 
Change in Reported 
Value 
Change in price 
before 
disclosure 
1 Pharmaceuticals - -  
2 Chemicals & By-products -  - 
3 Cement, Lime & Gypsum - -  
4 Other Non-metallic Mineral Products -  - 
5 Motor Vehicles And Auto Parts -  - 
6 Basic Metals -  - 
7 Other Financial Intermediaries -  - 
8 Textiles -  - 
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Because of same reason as previous hypothesis, we have 2 industries which were candidate for price 
manipulation investigation and also 2 industries for prices change before disclosure date although they have no 
significant change in their reported values. 
Prices change before disclosure date would be results of information asymmetry. So, we can investigate them for 
finding evidence about private information trading in these companies. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this research we examined the relation between forecasting report mandatory disclosure and stock price 
fluctuation. Hypothesizes of this research examine the relationship between two variables over three years ending to 
2012. 
We found evidence of fluctuation in stock prices before disclosure indicate that information was released to the 
market before official disclosure. In the other word, stock prices react to the unofficially released information and 
rumors to the market around the releasing new officially disclosure date. This fraudulent attempt was initiated by price 
manipulation in cases which we don’t see significant price change during forecasted disclosure even if there are 
significant change in reported earning values. 
Results of the first hypothesis showed that there was a significant relationship between releasing forecasted 
information and stock price fluctuations in the listed companies in TSE. This effect also represented importance of this 
information to the investor in TSE. 
In the next hypothesis we analyzed this effectiveness in companies and industries as the whole. Results of the 
second hypothesis showed that there was a significant relationship between releasing forecasted information and 
stock price fluctuations in the listed industries in TSE. These industries were selected among industries that had 
timely forecast disclosure in adapting to SEO’s rule. 
We found that fraudulent attempts in the market exchange including price manipulation and insider trading were 
increasing during research period. Nevertheless, the public policy implications of our results are that, regulators 
should not fall back on a catch-all requirements to ensure managements realistic forecast but they should motivate 
companies to early rather than timely disclosures of price-sensitive information to public for preventing from further 
information asymmetry. 
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